Corporate social responsibility: country-level predispositions and the consequences of choosing a level of disclosure by de Villiers, Charl & Marques, Ana
1 
 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY,  
COUNTRY-LEVEL PREDISPOSITIONS AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
CHOOSING A LEVEL OF DISCLOSURE 
 
Charl de Villiers* 
AUT University, New Zealand 
and University of Pretoria 
cdev@aut.ac.nz 
 
Ana Marques
a
 
Nova School of Business and Economics 
Universidade Nova de Lisboa 
ana_marques@novasbe.pt 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements: The authors appreciate the valuable feedback and suggestions 
provided by Dan Dhaliwal, Vic Naiker, Joana Story, Marna de Klerk; workshop 
participants at the University of Amsterdam, University of Rotterdam, Universidad 
Carlos III, Nova School of Business and Economics, The University of Waikato, and 
University of Otago; and the reviewers, discussant and participants at the AFAANZ 
Conference 2013 and the European Accounting Association Conference 2014.  Ana 
Marques gratefully acknowledges the financial support of Nova Forum. The authors 
appreciate the research assistance of Luís Araújo. 
 
*Corresponding author: Professor Charl de Villiers 
Department of Accounting, AUT University - Private Bag 92006, Auckland, New 
Zealand 
Telephone: +64 21 0715 703 
Email: cdev@aut.ac.nz 
 
a
 Nova School of Business and Economics, Campus de Campolide 
10099-032 Lisboa, Portugal 
Telephone: +351918080250 
Email: ana_marques@novasbe.pt 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 We study the different levels of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures of the 
largest European firms. We find that  firms are more predisposed to disclose more CSR 
information in countries with: better investor protection, higher levels of democracy, 
more effective government services, higher quality regulations, more press freedom, 
and a lower commitment to environmental policies. Our analysis of the association of 
different levels of CSR disclosure with share prices indicates that a high level of CSR 
disclosure is associated with higher share prices, whereas a low level of CSR disclosure 
in sensitive industries is associated with lower share prices (compared to no disclosure). 
These results are also present when we analyse changes in CSR disclosure, and are 
robust to the inclusion of an accounting quality measure in our model. The overall effect 
of the association of higher levels of CSR disclosure with higher share prices is stronger 
in countries with more democracy, more government effectiveness, better regulatory 
quality, and more press freedom. Therefore, market participants find CSR disclosures 
more informative in countries where investors are in a better position to voice their 
concerns and where there is better regulation and more effective government 
implementation of regulations.  
 
Keywords: corporate social responsibility, global reporting initiative, voluntary 
disclosure  
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INTRODUCTION 
Firms increasingly disclose social and environmental information, otherwise 
known as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) information (O'Dwyer 2011). We 
define CSR disclosures as disclosures covered by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
framework. Whereas financial disclosures are highly regulated, CSR information is 
mostly disclosed on a voluntary basis. Firms disclose CSR information for two main 
reasons (Moser and Martin 2012): to 1) conform to societal expectations and thereby 
ensure continued access to resources, such as capital, customer support, etc., and to 2) 
provide additional information that allows capital market participants to more accurately 
assess firms’ financial prospects and risk profiles, potentially leading to higher share 
prices and higher firm values. We examine both these reasons, referring to the first as 
predispositions (using legitimacy theory in hypothesis development), and the second as 
consequences (using agency theory in hypothesis development).  
Capital market participants pay specific attention to CSR disclosures as evidenced 
by a recent survey that shows 1) investors and analysts use CSR information, and 2) 
they prefer corporate disclosures as the source for such information (Radley Yeldar 
2012). Empirical evidence also links CSR disclosure with positive economic outcomes, 
such as reduced cost of equity capital (Dhaliwal et al. 2011), and increased analyst 
forecast accuracy (Dhaliwal et al. 2012). However, the prior research does not 
consistently report a positive relationship between CSR and economic outcomes. For 
example, Hassel, Nilsson, and Nyquist (2005) report a negative correlation with share 
prices, and Gietl, Göttsche, Habisch, Roloff and Schauer (2012) find a negative 
correlation with Tobin’s Q. These counterintuitive findings suggest a need for further 
study to gain a better understanding of the conditions where CSR disclosures are linked 
4 
 
with positive economic performance, as well as the characteristics of an appropriate 
measure to proxy CSR disclosures. 
We examine the predispositions towards, and the consequences of, CSR 
disclosures by the top 500 European firms during the period 2007 to 2010, using the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guideline’s level of CSR disclosure as a measure of 
CSR disclosure. We provide more information on the GRI and our measure in the next 
section of the paper. By way of predispositions, we identify both country level variables 
and firm level variables that influence the level of firms’ CSR disclosures. We then 
examine whether different levels of CSR disclosures are associated with higher/lower 
share prices, and document the type of country where CSR disclosures and positive 
economic outcomes are more closely linked. 
We focus on share prices, because these incorporate the market’s assessment both 
of  firms’ future cash flows and of an appropriate discount rate that reflect the risk 
inherent in the expected cash flows (i.e. cost of capital). For example, CSR disclosures 
that address strategic market opportunities will influence the capital market’s 
expectation of future cash flows, and disclosures that address CSR-related risk 
management procedures will influence the market’s risk assessment. Therefore, share 
prices provide wide-ranging market information in a single measure, incorporating more 
information content than cost of capital. CSR initiatives themselves and any potential 
benefits associated with CSR initiatives tend to be long-term in nature (De Villiers et al. 
2011) and therefore we choose a measure (share price) that incorporates the market’s 
view of all future prospects.  
An improved understanding of the predispositions towards and consequences of 
CSR disclosures is of interest to capital market participants (because it can inform their 
investment decision making), managers (because they will be interested in any apparent 
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advantages that emanate from voluntary CSR disclosure, including higher share prices, 
that could enhance job security and incentive pay), regulators (because if there are 
opportunities for managers to act opportunistically, they may want to consider 
implementing CSR disclosure regulation), and social and environmental activists 
(because our findings may assist them in forming opinions on firms’ CSR activities 
based on CSR disclosure). 
We discuss our findings and our contribution to the literature in a separate 
discussion section immediately before the conclusion. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
What CSR disclosures are used for: a theoretical view 
According to Moser and Martin (2012), firms disclose CSR information 1) to 
show conformance to societal expectations, and 2) to provide additional information to 
market participants. These two broad reasons for disclosure can be further explored 
using, respectively, legitimacy theory and agency theory. Legitimacy theory 
encapsulates the idea that firms have to conform to societal norms in order to prosper 
(De Villiers and Van Staden 2006), whereas agency theory focusses on explaining the 
motivations and actions of both agents (i.e. managers) and principals (i.e. investors) 
(Healy and Palepu 2001). Without providing a full exposition of the basics of these 
theories, we will apply them to explain the causal links between the constructs in our 
setting. 
According to legitimacy theory, firms will use CSR disclosures in order to show 
conformance to social norms. Far from merely trying to inform, these disclosures often 
embody attempts to deceive and manipulate information, as long as the disclosures 
advance the image of the firm as being socially responsible (Lawrence et al. 2013). 
6 
 
Where social norms are strongly expressed, e.g. through the media, firms have been 
shown to react with additional CSR disclosure (Brown and Deegan 1998). Social norms 
find stronger expression in certain countries and industries, therefore legitimacy theory 
would predict more CSR disclosure in countries with a stronger environmental agenda 
and in sensitive industries (Glennie and Lodhia 2013).  
According to agency theory, managers make disclosure choices that would 
maximise their own job security and incentive pay (Healy and Palepu 2001). Therefore, 
managers can be expected to disclose CSR information in such a way that the firm’s 
future prospects appear to be positive, both in terms of cash flows and risk profile. This 
implies that positive CSR information will be emphasised, and that previously known 
CSR information of a negative nature will be dealt with in order to explain that risks are 
properly managed, and that future cash flow effects and future liabilities will be 
minimised. CSR disclosure is not generally used to reveal new negative facts (De 
Villiers and Van Staden 2011). Thus CSR disclosures tend to emphasise positive news, 
ignore some negative news, and put a positive spin on other bad news. Far from being 
an overly negative assessment of managers’ motives, this explanation of the use of CSR 
disclosure perfectly aligns with prior research findings, including studies using a 
legitimacy theory framework (e.g. Deegan and Rankin 1996). 
To summarise, given the way managers use CSR disclosure, the level of CSR 
disclosure can be expected to be higher where there is a greater perceived need to show 
conformance with social norms (legitimacy theory), where there is CSR information 
that could impact financial returns positively (agency theory), or where there is known 
negative CSR information that needs to be explained (agency theory and legitimacy 
theory). 
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CSR disclosure measure used in CSR studies  
Prior studies use a CSR disclosure measure that is derived from one disclosure 
source, such as annual reports (Ingram and Frazier 1980), 10K reports (Cho and Patten 
2007), websites (Clarkson et al. 2008), or stand-alone reports (Dhaliwal et al. 2011, 
2012; Simnett et al. 2009); use an indicator variable with limited variability (e.g. 
Dhaliwal et al. 2011, 2012); or are based on self-constructed indexes (e.g. Clarkson et 
al. 2008), potentially raising reliability issues and the possibility of incorrect coding. 
The use of a CSR disclosure measure that overcomes these shortcomings would 
be a major advance on the prior literature and could improve our understanding of the 
impact of the level of CSR disclosure. 
 
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is a non-profit organization that promotes 
economic, environmental and social sustainability by providing a comprehensive 
sustainability reporting framework in cooperation with global business, governments, 
civil society, labour, academic and professional institutions (GRI, 2012). 
According to KPMG (2011) 80% of the world’s 250 largest companies and 69% 
of the top 100 companies in the 34 countries their report covers adhere to GRI reporting 
guidelines. Indeed, KPMG (2011) refers to GRI as the global de facto CSR disclosure 
standard. CSR disclosure is high among European firms, especially in the countries that 
represent a large share of our sample firms. Table 1 shows that eight countries account 
for 76% of our observations and these countries all rate highly in the KPMG (2011) 
report in terms of quality of CSR disclosure, with the percentage of the top 100 firms in 
each of the 8 countries disclosing CSR information being 100% in the UK, 94% in 
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France, 62% in Germany, 64% in Switzerland, 72% in Sweden, 82% in the Netherlands, 
88% in Spain, and 74% in Italy (KPMG, 2011). This shows a very high likelihood that 
firms in our sample disclose CSR information; a high likelihood that they use the GRI 
guidelines; and because of the high uptake of CSR disclosures, a need to use a 
disclosure measure that indicates the level of CSR disclosure.
1
 
 
The financial consequences of different levels of CSR disclosure  
The prior research use simple CSR disclosure measures, such as an indicator 
variable that merely show whether a firm have or do not have CSR disclosure (e.g. 
Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Dhaliwal et al. 2013); or a variable that allows more variation, but 
used in such a way that the effects are assumed to be linear and non-differentiated.  
Schadéwitz and Niskala (2010), De Klerk and De Villiers (2012), and De Klerk et 
al. (2015) examine the value relevance of CSR disclosures using an Ohlson (1995) 
model. All three studies use a GRI guideline based measure of CSR disclosure and find 
CSR disclosure to have a positive association with firm value in Finland (Schadéwitz 
and Niskala 2010), South Africa (De Klerk and De Villiers 2012), and the UK (De 
Klerk et al. 2015). These studies use a simple GRI indicator variable that does not take 
cognizance of the GRI level, or an ordinal GRI variable that mix the GRI level with 
another aspect of disclosure. Neither of these GRI-based measures focuses on the GRI 
disclosure level. The indicator variable ignores the levels of disclosure, whereas the 
combined measure combines two potentially confounding issues.   
                                                          
1
 Note that the percentage of firms that disclose CSR is high, because the KPMG (2011) study includes all 
firms disclosing some form of social or environmental information. The percentage of firms disclosing 
CSR using the GRI guidelines is much lower, because it only includes firms that disclose information on 
a range of social and environmental issues, and disclose this information in accordance with GRI 
guidelines. Integrated reporting initiatives may increase the uptake of GRI (Atkins et al. 2015; Stent and 
Dowler 2015).  
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The only multi-country study we are aware of that use a GRI-based disclosure 
measure, assesses firm value via Tobin’s Q (Gietl et al. 2012). However, this study has 
two major shortcomings, namely that it ignores country differences (and only include 
firm level control variables), and that the CSR disclosure measure used in their study 
considers a combination of the GRI level of disclosure and whether the GRI level is 
validated by a third party. This combination is not helpful, as the relationship between 
these two different aspects and any economic consequences are potentially in opposite 
directions. The potentially confounding disclosure measure used in Gietl et al. (2012) 
could explain their main finding, namely that disclosure at the GRI A level, validated by 
a third party, is associated with a lower Tobin’s Q. The study reports that the relation 
with the similarly defined GRI B and GRI C levels of validated disclosure is not 
significantly related to Tobin’s Q. 
With these CSR disclosure measures, the possibility that different levels of CSR 
disclosure could lead to different financial outcomes were never considered. A study 
that use measures of the different levels of CSR disclosure where a linear relationship 
between the different levels were not assumed, would add to our understanding, and 
answer questions not asked before. 
 
The country characteristics that drive CSR disclosure  
The few prior multi-country CSR studies typically use two country level 
measures, namely a “code law/common law” indicator variable and a continuous “rule 
of law” measure (e.g. Simnett et al. 2009, Dhaliwal et al. 2012).  These variables, 
because of their broad nature, do not facilitate an understanding of the more specific 
underlying mechanisms at work. The code law/common law indicator variable has been 
severely criticised before (Lindahl and Schadéwitz 2013).  
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Prior multi-country research argue that common law countries (e.g. the US and 
the UK) are more investor oriented compared to code law countries (e.g. France) that 
tend to be more stakeholder oriented. A stakeholder orientation suggests a greater 
emphasis on corporate responsibilities towards all stakeholders (as opposed to an 
investor focus) and therefore a greater propensity to provide CSR information. 
However, the UK, a common law country, happens to be one of the countries where 
CSR disclosure is particularly popular (KPMG 2011),rendering this measure 
inappropriate for a CSR study. 
The World Bank’s ‘rule of law’ index provides an indication of the confidence 
citizens have in the ability of the country’s laws, law enforcement, and judicial system, 
to ensure a fair outcome for all. However, the World Bank rule of law index provides a 
measure of the overall rule of law within a country, including issues not directly related 
to corporate affairs and investor protection measures. 
A study that use new and more appropriate country level measures, such as 
investor protection mechanisms, democratic institutions, press freedom, and the 
prioritization of environmental policy goals, could enhance our understandings of the 
many drivers of CSR disclosure.  
 
Diversity of countries included in multi-country CSR studies  
Prior multi-country CSR studies include a diverse range of countries (e.g. Simnett 
et al. 2009, Dhaliwal et al. 2012). The results of these studies could potentially be 
driven by a few outlier country-level measures. For example, in additional tests one of 
the main results in the Simnett et al. (2009) paper is shown to disappear when USA 
observations are dropped from the sample. 
11 
 
A study focused on a group of countries that are similar in terms of factors like 
economic development, but different in terms of relative levels of investor protection, 
democracy, government efficiency, regulatory quality, press freedom, and emphasis on 
environmental policies, could enhance our understandings of the country-level driving 
forces behind CSR disclosure and under which conditions CSR disclosure are more 
closely linked to financial consequences. 
 
Predispositions of CSR disclosure 
Legitimacy theory suggests firms need CSR disclosure to demonstrate 
conformance to social norms. However, without mechanisms to pressurise firms, 
societal concerns would be subjugated by more powerful players, such as the state. 
Shareholders rely on investor protection regulations to ensure that they have sufficient 
and reliable information to make investment decisions. Both shareholders and analysts 
use the CSR information disclosed by firms in their investment decisions (Radley 
Yeldar 2012). Users can influence regulations designed to ensure access to CSR 
information more effectively in democratic countries and in countries where there is a 
high level of freedom of expression, leading to more informed investment decisions. In 
such countries, shareholders can rely on politicians and the media to amplify their 
concerns, leading in turn to greater levels of regulation, enforcement, and/or compliance 
by firms in order to avoid or delay additional regulation. In countries with a greater 
commitment to CSR, regulations would be more likely to carry financial consequences 
for failure to comply with CSR regulations. Therefore, we identify measures of 
countries’ 1) investor protection, 2) democracy, 3) government effectiveness, 4) 
regulatory quality, 5) press freedom, and 6) commitment to CSR.  The World Bank’s 
‘rule of law’ index provides a measure of the overall rule of law within a country, 
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including issues not directly related to corporate affairs and investor protection 
measures. Therefore, we use a different, more sophisticated measure specifically related 
to investor protection, namely an anti-self-dealing score, based on Djankov et al. (2008). 
The World Bank publishes three country-level indicators related to democracy, 
government effectiveness, and regulatory quality. The first factor measures the 
democracy and freedom of the citizens in a country. Individual freedom of expression 
and association enable them to be more vocal about their concerns, including in areas 
like CSR. The World Bank calls this measure ‘voice and accountability’.  The second 
factor measures the quality of public services (including their level of bureaucracy) and 
its independence from political pressures. If services are unbiased and efficient, 
businesses’ CSR practices are more likely to come under scrutiny. This measure is 
called ‘government effectiveness’. The third factor captures whether the country has 
sound policies and regulations, including competition regulation. This should promote 
companies’ development and fair practices, including disclosure of CSR practices. We 
measure this factor using the World Bank variable ‘regulatory quality’. As far as we are 
aware, no prior published CSR study use these World Bank measures.
2
 
Prior research has shown the ability of the press to influence CSR disclosures 
(Clarkson et al. 2008, Brown and Deegan 1998). These were single country studies. In 
our cross-country setting where media coverage varies across countries, the firm-level 
measures these prior studies employ would not be appropriate. However, we are able to 
control for the general level of press freedom associated with each country in our 
sample. We identify the Reporters without Borders organization’s ‘freedom of press’ 
index as an appropriate measure. The aim of Reporters without Borders is to promote 
press freedom and reporter safety throughout the world by drawing attention to 
                                                          
2
 A conference paper, Cahan et al. (2012) also uses these World Bank measures. 
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countries and incidents where violations of press freedom occur. In line with prior 
research that generally find that higher levels of press coverage correlate with higher 
levels of CSR disclosure we expect firms in countries with higher levels of press 
freedom to disclose more CSR information. 
In recent years, sustainability, environmental issues, climate change, and 
greenhouse gas emissions have featured high on the public agenda in many countries. 
We use a country level measure that measures the importance of this item, namely Yale 
Law School’s environmental performance index, which emphasizes law, policy and 
scientific issues. Firms in countries that show a greater commitment to an 
environmental agenda could be more likely to disclose more CSR information to reflect 
the local social concerns and to respond to higher levels of stakeholder pressure to 
provide information. However, in more environmentally committed countries, CSR 
related issues are more likely to lead to negative financial consequences and managers 
may fear that additional CSR disclosure will play into the hand of potential litigants. For 
example, the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill cost BP billions of dollars. Fear of litigation 
would make managers less likely to disclose CSR information. Based on these opposing 
arguments, we form no prior expectation regarding the direction of the association 
between this particular environmental commitment variable and the level of CSR 
disclosure. 
The above discussion regarding predisposition to CSR disclosure at the country 
level leads to the following hypothesis, stated in alternate form: 
 
H1: Firms disclose higher levels of CSR information in countries with less corporate 
self-dealing, more democratic rights for citizens, more effective government 
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administration, better regulatory quality, more press freedom, and less/more 
commitment to an environmental agenda.  
 
 
Consequences of CSR disclosure: Share price, firm value, other  
According to agency theory, managers can be expected to disclose CSR 
information that could influence the financial performance of the firm positively 
through the mechanism of providing information that will allow investors to reassess 
the firm’s expected cash flow and/or risk profile (Healy and Palepu 2001). In addition, 
still arguing from an agency theory perspective, managers can be expected to provide 
additional information about previously known negative CSR information, to ensure 
that investors do not exaggerate the cash flow and risk implications when making 
investment decisions (De Villiers and Van Staden 2011). By providing investors with 
the information they need to reassess future cash flow and risk, additional CSR 
disclosure enable firms to reduce information asymmetry and avoid adverse selection, 
generally leading to positive economic outcomes.  
In a meta-analysis of 52 studies, Orlitzky et al. (2003) find evidence of a positive 
relationship between CSR performance (not disclosure) and financial performance. 
Survey results show that market participants prefer to obtain CSR information from 
corporate sources, i.e. CSR disclosures (Radley Yeldar 2012, De Villiers & Van Staden 
2010, De Villiers & Van Staden 2012). Therefore, a positive link between CSR 
disclosure and financial performance is plausible. 
Two recent articles focus on standalone CSR reports and their financial 
consequences and provide further evidence in support of a positive relationship 
(Dhaliwal et al. 2011, 2012). Dhaliwal et al. (2011) examine the effect of publishing a 
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standalone CSR report on the cost of equity capital and find that firms that publish a 
standalone CSR report for the first time experience a reduction in the lagged cost of 
equity capital, for firms with superior CSR performance. Dhaliwal et al. (2012) find that 
analyst forecast accuracy is better for firms that publish a standalone CSR report.  
Schadéwitz and Niskala (2010), De Klerk and De Villiers (2012), and De Klerk et 
al. (2015) provide evidence in support of a positive relationship between CSR 
disclosure and share prices, whereas Gietl et al. (2012) report a negative correlation 
with market values. Prior research on the value relevance of the environmental aspect of 
CSR disclosure also provides inconsistent results, reporting a negative correlation 
(Hassel et al. 2005), no correlation for non-financial CSR disclosure (Moneva and 
Cuellar 2009), or a positive correlation (Clarkson et al. 2013, Plumlee et al. 2010).   
The arguments derived from theory, as well as much of the prior research 
evidence provided above, lead to the following hypothesis, stated in alternate form: 
 
H2: Firms that disclose higher levels of CSR information have higher share prices. 
 
According to legitimacy theory, CSR disclosures are aimed at legitimising the 
firm in the eyes of a broader set of stakeholders than investors and potential investors. 
These stakeholders often include customers, employees, government, and pressure 
groups, e.g. environmental groups. These CSR disclosures are aimed at “enhanced 
reputation with customers, greater employee satisfaction and retention, less regulation, 
etc.” (Moser & Martin 2012: 798). Certain country-level and firm-level characteristics 
predispose firms to disclose more of this kind of CSR information, leading investors to 
expect elevated levels of CSR disclosure from such firms. There is a greater need to 
legitimise in sensitive industries, leading to higher levels of CSR disclosure by firms 
16 
 
operating in sensitive industries, such as mining. This high level of CSR disclosure is 
likely to be expected by investors. Firms that do not meet the market’s CSR disclosure 
expectation are likely to be suspected of trying to hide adverse CSR information. 
Market participants will factor this perceived risk into their share price valuation 
decisions, leading to lower share prices for suspected firms.  
This line of argument leads to the following hypothesis, stated in alternate form: 
  
H3: Firms that disclose lower levels of CSR information have lower share prices. 
 
We are also interested in examining the effect of country governance measures on 
the relationship between CSR disclosure and firm value. To investigate this relation we 
add country measures and interaction terms to our basic model. In this exploratory 
analysis we focus on the most promising country level measures, as indicated by the 
results of the tests of our first hypothesis. 
 
METHOD 
Sample 
We begin our sample selection by considering all firms included in the Financial 
Times 2010 classification of the 500 largest European firms, which is based on the 2009 
market value. This allows us to analyse a set of firms that are economically important 
and that operate in different institutional and economic conditions. We next exclude 73 
financial firms (banks and financial services companies), as their unique financial 
characteristics would render comparison with firms in other industries senseless. We 
also lose 61 firms, for which we cannot find financial data on Datastream. This leaves 
us with an initial sample of 366 firms.  
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Our first step in hand-collecting the level of GRI information disclosed by firms is 
to examine the CSR reports of these firms in each of the four years analysed: 2007 to 
2010.  Not all firms have such a report. When such a report does not exist, we examine 
the annual report of the firm. When analysing these documents we first establish 
whether these firms disclose a GRI score in that year or not. As a second step, when a 
GRI score is disclosed, we record the level of the firm’s GRI compliance (A, B, or C). 
From our potential sample of 1,464 observations (366 firms * 4 years) we lose 
some observations due to missing data on some of the variables collected from 
Datastream. We keep the number of observations stable at 1,227 for all analyses related 
to the predispositions for CSR disclosure. However, for the consequences analyses, we 
allow the number of observations to vary, in order to maximize the number of 
observations used in each estimation. 
 
Research design: predispositions 
In order to test hypothesis 1, which analyses the predispositions for CSR 
disclosure, we estimate the following general model: 
 
CSR Disclosure = α0 + α1Country Institutional Variables + α2Firm Level Variables + ε 
           (1) 
Given that our CSR disclosure measure is not continuous, but indicates levels of 
disclosure, we use an ordered logit model. Annex 1 provides a summary of the variables 
included to facilitate referencing. 
 
CSR disclosure measure. We use firms’ GRI disclosure level as a proxy for their 
CSR disclosure. Under the GRI G3 guidelines, in force during the 2007-2010 period, 
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firms can choose to disclose a limited number of CSR items for a C-rated GRI 
disclosure level, increase their disclosures for a B-rated level, or disclose the full ambit 
of GRI guideline CSR disclosures for an A-rated level. We convert this GRI disclosure 
level to GRI_Score as follows: A=3, B=2, C=1. We attribute a score of 0 to all firms 
that do not follow GRI. Note that the GRI disclosure level measures the level of 
compliance to the GRI G3 guidelines and not the quality of the reporting or the 
sustainability performance. 
Country institutional variables. We use six country level variables that generally 
represent the level of investor protection, level of individual freedom of expression, and 
societal concern with CSR issues.  
We follow Djankov et al. (2008) by using their anti-self-dealing measure, an 
index that reflects legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by 
corporate insiders, a specific part of corporate governance, taking into account (1) vote 
by mail; (2) shares not blocked or deposited; (3) cumulative voting; (4) oppressed 
minority; (5) pre-emptive rights; and (6) capital to call meeting. This measure, Law, can 
range between 0 and 5, with higher numbers representing less self-dealing or better 
governance.  
We also use three World Bank measures, namely (1) citizens’ ability to select a 
government and voice their concerns (Voice), (2) public service and policy quality and 
effectiveness (Gov_Eff), and (3) sound regulatory quality (Reg_Qual).
3
  The values of 
these measures range between -2.5 to 2.5, where higher values reflect higher citizen 
participation (Voice), more effective governments (Gov_Eff), and higher regulatory 
quality (Reg_Qual).   
                                                          
3
 See http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/mc_countries.asp 
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Reporters Without Borders publish an index reflecting the degree of freedom of 
journalists and the media in more than 170 countries.
4
 Values range from 0 to 112.5, 
with lower values reflecting higher freedom of the press. Therefore, lower values of this 
measure, Press, indicate higher level of press freedom.  
Our final measure is the environmental performance index of created by The Yale 
Center for Environmental Law and Policy and the Center for International Earth Science 
Information Network at Columbia University. This index covers more than 150 
countries and is released every second year (Env_Perf).
5
 Values can range between 0 to 
100, higher values indicating countries that strongly pursue environmental policy goals.  
 Firm level variables. One of the most consistent determinants of environmental 
disclosure is industry (Summerhays and De Villiers 2012). We use two environmentally 
sensitive industry indicator variables for the industries identified by De Villiers et al. 
(2011)
6
, Ind_Sens for the forestry, metals mining, coal mining, oil and gas exploration, 
paper and pulp, chemicals, pharmaceuticals and plastics, iron and steel industries; and 
Utility for the electricity, gas and waste water industries. In addition, we identify from 
the prior literature, nine firm level variables to control for the level of CSR disclosures 
(e.g., Clarkson et al. 2008, De Villiers and Van Staden 2011).  These variables are size 
(Size), profitability (ROA), need of additional finance (Fin), book-to-market value of 
equity (B_M), leverage (Lev), level of international trade (Internat), share price 
volatility (Volat), age of assets (New), and capital expenditure (Capex). The prior 
literature suggests the expected direction of the association between these variables and 
                                                          
4
 See http://en.rsf.org/ 
5
 See http://epi.yale.edu/; we used the 2008 data for 2007 and the mean of 2008 and 2010 for 2009. 
6
 Sensitive industries are defined as in De Villiers et al. (2011) as those with SIC codes between 800-899 
(Forestry), 1000-1099 (Metal Mining), 1200-1399 (Coal Mining and Oil and Gas Exploration), 2600-
2699 (Paper and Pulp Mills), 2800-3099 (Chemicals, Pharmaceutical and Plastics Manufacturing), 3300-
3399 (Iron and Steel Manufacturing), and 4900-4999 (Electricity, Gas and Waste Water). 
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CSR disclosure to be positive in most cases, except New (negative), and Volat (where 
we are unable to form a prior expectation).  
 
Research design: consequences 
We examine the influence of CSR disclosure level on share prices (hypothesis 2) 
with the use of a modified Ohlson (1995) research design, where share price is assumed 
to be determined by earnings, book value, the variables of interest, and control 
variables.7 Our model is as follows: 
Share_Price = β0 + β1EPS + β2BV_pS + β3GRI_based_disclosure_measure(s) + β4Size +  
                       β5Ind_Sens + β6Utility + year dummies + country dummies + ε             (2) 
 
Where GRI_based_disclosure_measure(s) can be GRI_Score, a measure coded 3 
for firms with a GRI disclosure level of A, 2 for B, 1 for C, and 0 for firms that do not 
follow GRI; or three indicator variables, GRI_A, GRI_B, and GRI_C, coded 1 for 
disclosure at that GRI level, and 0 otherwise. We expect GRI_Score and a high level of 
GRI disclosure (GRI_A) to be positively and significantly related to Share_Price.  
In the Ohlson (1995) model it is assumed that market price per share is positively 
associated with book value per share as well as with the value of earnings per share, as 
these are indicative of future dividends. Therefore, we expect to find positive 
coefficients for these two independent variables. Aboody et al. (2004) add analyst 
growth forecast to their modified Ohlson (1995) model; Hann et al. (2007) add growth 
in sales, R&D expense and number of employees. In following these prior examples of 
adding additional controls appropriate to the issue under investigation, we identify three 
additional firm level control variables, namely size, industry, and utility. These controls 
                                                          
7
 Note that earnings and book value replace dividends in valuation, according to the clean surplus relation. 
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are appropriate, because the relationship between CSR disclosure and firm value may be 
quite different for firms in sensitive industries (and regulated utilities), compared to 
other industries; and the same applies to larger firms that are potentially more exposed 
to political cost, due to their increased visibility (Massa et al. 2015). We include year 
dummies to control for any effects specific to a particular year. Finally, because we 
know from the predispositions discussion above that country specific issues influence 
CSR disclosure, we suspect that country specific effects may be at work in the 
relationship between CSR disclosure and market values. Therefore, we include country 
dummies to account for country sources of heterogeneity and we follow Aggarwal et al. 
(2009) in their multi-country approach by clustering residuals at the country level. 
 
FINDINGS 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics, with Panel A providing disclosure 
information per country, Panel B providing information regarding the frequencies of our 
CSR disclosure measures, and Panel C providing information for all variables used. 
Panel A shows that our sample covers 22 European countries. Nineteen of these 
countries have at least 12 observations. Most of our observations represent firms from 
the UK (246), France (202), Germany (149), Switzerland (92), and Sweden (79). This 
panel also shows that the use of GRI is widespread among large European firms and not 
confined to a limited number of countries, e.g. note that the mean for GRI_Score is 1.0 
or above for eight of the countries in our sample. Panel B shows that nearly one third of 
our observations report that they use GRI guidelines for their CSR disclosures, with 
more than 16% following the GRI guidelines fully (A disclosure level), over 11% 
following them to the B disclosure level, and more than 3% following GRI to the C 
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disclosure level.
8
 Panel C shows descriptive statistics for all variables, e.g., the mean 
return on assets is 7.1% and the mean book to market value of equity is 55.4%. 
Ind_Sens shows that about a quarter of our observations are from firms in 
environmentally sensitive industries, whilst Utility shows another 7% to be regulated 
utilities. 
<<<Table 1 about here>>> 
Correlations 
Table 2 shows the correlations between GRI_Score, country variables, and firm 
level variables. Panel A reveals that a number of country variables are highly correlated, 
especially among the three measures derived from the World Bank (Voice, Gov_Eff, and 
Reg_Qual) and the press freedom measure, Press. Law and Env_Perf are correlated with 
other country level measures in the range from 0.3 to 0.34. These high correlations 
suggest the need for care in regression specification. Except between country level 
variables, none of the correlations among the variables used in equation 1 
(predispositions) are above 0.4. 
<<<Table 2 about here>>> 
Predispositions 
We now analyse whether country-level factors are associated with the level of 
CSR information disclosed by firms. Given that we know from the correlation statistics 
in Table 2 that some of the country variables we wish to study are highly correlated, we 
cannot include these variables in the same model without testing for multicollinearity. 
Thus, we estimate an ordinary least squares regression that includes all our country level 
                                                          
8
 The fact that about a third of the firms in our sample use GRI may seem low, but note that Gietl et al. 
(2012), using a sample of Eurostoxx 600 firms over the same time period (2007-2010), report that only 
240 of 1686 firms, or 14%, use GRI. 
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variables, as well as all our firm level variables, to inspect the variance inflation factors 
(VIFs). Two of the country level variables have VIFs above the standard benchmark of 
10, indicating the presence of multicollinearity issues. We deal with this problem in two 
ways. We first estimate separate ordered logit models for each country level variable 
including, in each case, all the firm level control variables. Next, we use principal 
component analysis on the country level variables to construct composite indexes which 
are capable of representing this group of variables, allowing us to consider the effects of 
all variables and interpret their joint impact (Kennedy 1998). 
Table 3 shows the results of ordered logit estimations for each country level 
measure in turn combined with all the firm level measures. For example, the first 
column shows that Law is positively and significantly related to GRI_Score at the 5% 
level when firm level variables are included. In similar fashion, Voice, Gov_Eff, 
Reg_Qual, and Press, are related to GRI_Score at the 1% level of significance and in 
the expected directions. Env_Perf is negatively related to GRI_Score at the 5% level. 
The directions of these associations are all consistent with the correlation table results 
(Table 2). Our results suggest that firms disclose higher levels of GRI information in 
countries with better investor protection (less anti-self-dealing), a greater ability to 
choose your own government, greater government efficiency, better regulatory quality, 
more press freedom, and less government commitment to environmental policy and law. 
These results provide evidence in support of our first hypothesis.  
The only one of these six measures mentioned in hypothesis 1 we did not form a 
prior expectation on the direction for, deals with countries’ environmental commitment. 
You may recall that we argued that firms in countries committed to an environmental 
agenda could, on the one hand, be expected to come under pressure to disclose more 
CSR information, but on the other hand, management could fear the likelihood of 
24 
 
increased environment-related litigation and liability. Fear of litigation appears to be a 
stronger motivation, resulting in less CSR disclosure in countries that demonstrate a 
higher commitment to environmental issues. 
Turning to firm level variables, a scan of all six regression results shows that most 
of these variables are significantly associated with GRI_Score, suggesting that firms are 
likely to disclose higher levels of CSR information if they: are larger, are more 
profitable, have high book to market firms, are more leveraged, use older equipment, 
spend more on capital, and operate in environmentally sensitive industries. However, 
we do not find support for an association between CSR disclosures and firms 
anticipating the need for additional finance, being exposed to international trade, or 
share price volatility. 
<<<Table 3 about here>>> 
In a second method of dealing with the multicollinearity issue caused by the high 
correlation between the country level measures, we now consider all six measures at the 
same time to learn more about the way that country variables interact to provide an 
indication of the predisposition of different firms to provide different levels of CSR 
disclosure. As in Li (2010) we perform a principle component analysis of all variables 
and include the resulting factors into a regression model. Table 4 provides information 
about this analysis. We use the first two components, because they have Eigenvalues 
above 1 (Panel A). Panel B shows the factor loadings and reveals that component 1 is 
determined mostly by Voice, Gov_Eff, Reg_Qual, and Press. Given that Voice and Press 
both relate to citizens’ and investors’ ability to voice their concerns, and that Gov_Eff 
and Reg_Qual both relate to the resultant regulation and the implementation of these 
regulations, we label it Governance/Democracy; whereas component 2 is determined 
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mostly by Law and thus we call it Country_Law. Panel C shows the calculated values 
for PC1 and PC2 by country, with higher values indicating better 
governance/democracy (PC1) and minority investor protection (PC2).
9
 When these 
components are used in the ordered logit regression, Governance/Democracy is highly 
significant in the predicted direction, as shown in Panel D. Country_Law is marginally 
significantly related to GRI_Score (at the 10% level). All the firm level variables 
correlate in the same directions as before and the same three (Fin, Volat, and Internat) 
are not significant. Table 4, Panel D therefore provides additional evidence in support of 
the country level hypothesis (H1) (relating to Law, Voice, Gov_Eff, Reg_Qual, and 
Press); and our firm level expectations (relating to size, profitability, book to market, 
leverage, age of equipment, capital expenditure, and sensitivity of industry). 
<<<Table 4 about here>>> 
Having established that each of our six country level variables, as well as the 
combined variable, Governance/Democracy, are significantly associated with the level 
of CSR disclosures, we now proceed to examine whether CSR disclosures are 
associated with positive economic outcomes. We do this first in general terms and then 
examine whether any positive economic outcomes are more pronounced in certain 
country types as measured by our country measures, individually and combined. 
Consequences – hypotheses testing 
In order to assess whether the CSR disclosure level of a firm has value relevance 
we use an Ohlson (1995) type model in a per share specification with additional control 
variables, as defined in equation 2. Table 5 shows the regression results after removing 
                                                          
9
 As can be expected, Switzerland (1.601) has a high score for governance and democracy, whereas 
Russia (-8.101) has a low score. In terms of minority investor protection, Russia (0.695) has a relatively 
high score compared to Switzerland (-0.319). This is due to the fact that PC2 consists mainly of the 
Djankov et al. (2008) anti-self-dealing index where Russia score 4 and Switzerland score 3. These scores 
are based on very specific investor protection legislation applicable in each country. 
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outliers by trimming the main continuous variables of the model (Share_Price, EPS, and 
BV_pS) at 1% and 99%. Country dummies control for any country effects in this test, 
because we do not (yet) include any country variables in the model. Table 5 shows the 
coefficient for GRI_Score to be positive and significant at the 1% level. This indicates 
that CSR disclosures are value relevant to investors in such a way that firms with higher 
levels of CSR disclosure are associated with higher share prices after controlling for 
several accounting measures. Note that our measure of the level of CSR disclosure, GRI 
disclosure level, measures the level of compliance to the GRI G3 guidelines and not the 
quality of the reporting or the sustainability performance. We perform the Heckman 
procedure, but self-selection bias does not appear to be an issue in our sample.
10
 
<<<Table 5 about here>>> 
Although the level of CSR disclosure is positively associated with share prices in 
general, hypothesis 3 suggests that the different levels of CSR disclosure may be 
associated with different outcomes. To examine this notion, we include each level of 
GRI disclosure separately in the equation as indicator variables, instead of the 
composite GRI_Score measure. The results shown in the final two columns of Table 5 
are very interesting, therein that the highest levels of CSR disclosure (GRI A and GRI 
B) are associated with higher share prices, but the lowest level of CSR disclosure (GRI 
C) is associated with lower share prices, all at the 5% level of statistical significance. 
These comparisons are made to firms that do not follow GRI guidelines at all. Thus our 
                                                          
10
 There is a potential self-selection bias when we include our disclosure measure as an independent 
variable, as firms can choose whether they disclose that they use the GRI for CSR disclosure. We 
therefore perform the Heckman procedure to re-estimate our base model, using all the determinants (or 
predispositions) used in Table 3 to estimate an indicator variable coded as one when a GRI score is 
disclosed and zero otherwise, in order to assess  whether we have a self-selection problem. Self-selection 
does not appear to be a significant concern, because lambda of the Mills ratio has a p-value of 0.93. 
Therefore, we do not use a two-step estimation when obtaining our next set of results. In order to 
establish that the variables used in our equation 1 are also determinants of the decision to disclose firms’ 
GRI level, we create an indicator variable GRI, coded one when the firm discloses a GRI level and zero 
otherwise. Untabulated results indicate these determinants are valid and findings are qualitatively similar 
to the results reported in Table 3. 
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results suggest that the market is sophisticated in its assessment of CSR disclosures and 
treat different levels of CSR disclosure in two diametrically opposed ways. Indeed, the 
differences between GRI_A and GRI_C as well as between GRI_B and GRI_C are both 
statistically different from zero (whereas the difference between GRI_A and GRI_B is 
not statistically different from zero). Higher levels of CSR disclosure are associated 
with high share prices, but a low level of CSR disclosure may lead investors to question 
firms’ reasons for not disclosing more comprehensively. These suspicions may lead 
investors to conclude that firms disclosing a low level of CSR information have 
something to hide, resulting in lower valuations. 
 Another possible explanation for our results is that firms disclosing at the lower 
levels have pre-existing CSR issues that are known to the market. Managers of firms 
with such pre-existing issues might be expected to disclose more CSR information in 
order to allay market concerns and mimic other firms. However, our analysis here 
appears to indicate that firms with pre-existing CSR issues cannot easily mimic other 
firms’ CSR disclosures. If these explanations for the surprising result, that low levels of 
CSR disclosure is associated with lower share prices compared to no disclosure at all, 
were true, we would expect the result to be driven by firms in sensitive industries. 
Therefore, we estimate a regression similar to the final columns in Table 5, but 
including three interaction terms (GRI_A X Ind_Sens, GRI_B X Ind_Sens, GRI_C X 
Ind_Sens). The (untabulated) results are that GRI_C X Ind_Sens is significant at the 1% 
level, but that GRI_C is not statistically significant, lending weight to our explanation 
that CSR disclosure at lower levels than expected for firms in sensitive industries could 
lead to lower share prices.   
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Consequences – excluding firms that do not follow GRI disclosure guidelines 
Our measure of CSR disclosure is based on companies disclosing the level to 
which they follow the GRI guidelines. Although GRI is the most popular CSR 
guideline, especially among European firms (KPMG 2011), there is a possibility that 
some firms in our sample disclose high levels of CSR information without indicating 
that they follow GRI guidelines. We would have coded such firms’ disclosure measures 
(GRI_Score, GRI_A, GRI_B, and  GRI_C) as “0”, thereby reducing the likelihood of 
getting our predicted results. We next perform tests to assess whether our results were 
influenced by this decision. Specifically, we ignore all firm-years where GRI_Score 
equals zero and re-estimate the equations reported in Table 5. The results, shown in 
Table 6, are all consistent with the main results in Table 5. Note that the coefficient for 
GRI_Score is positive and significantly associated with share prices, and that GRI_A 
and GRI_B are both positive and significantly higher than the effect of GRI_C (as the 
effect of this variable is included in the constant term). These results provide additional 
evidence that higher (lower) levels of CSR disclosure are associated with higher (lower) 
share prices; and more specifically that higher levels of CSR disclosures are associated 
with higher share prices 
   <<<Table 6 about here>>> 
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Consequences - causality 
Thus far, we have been careful not to imply causality by always referring to 
associations. We now move to specifications based on the changes in CSR disclosure in 
order to directly examine the association of changes in CSR disclosure with share 
prices. These specifications also address endogeneity concerns. 
We re-estimate our basic share valuation model, substituting the variable of 
interest with change in GRI level (Change_GRI_Level), a measure calculated as 
GRI_Scoret minus GRI_Scoret-1 that can take on a value from -3 to +3; and a second 
model where our focus is on First_time_GRI, an indicator variable coded as 1 if the 
company is following GRI for the first time in our sample period (excluding the first 
year, 2007) and 0 otherwise. 
The untabulated results show that Change_GRI_Level is positive and significant 
at the 1% level, with First_time_GRI positive and significant at the 10% level (p = 
0.070). This indicates that an increase (decrease) in the GRI level of CSR reporting is 
associated with higher (lower) share prices; and that following the GRI CSR guidelines 
for the first time is also associated with higher share prices. 
In all of our analyses, we use share prices three months after the balance date. To 
further address endogeneity concerns, we re-estimate our Table 5 models, but using the 
prior period share price, i.e. 3 months after the previous balance date (thus in most cases 
9 months before the current balance date). In both these models, our variables of interest 
(GRI_Score, GRI_A, GRI_B, and GRI_C) are not significant. 
A possible alternative interpretation of our results could be that profitable firms 
tend to disclose more CSR information. Profitable firms can be expected to have higher 
share prices, because of their profitability, not because of their CSR disclosure. To 
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control for profitability, we add ROA to our two main models. The untabulated results 
are qualitatively similar to our main findings, providing some assurance that reverse 
causality is unlikely. 
 
Consequences – by country 
We previously noted that, according to KPMG (2011), CSR disclosure is 
particularly popular in the UK. The UK is also the only country in our sample with a 
common law system, as opposed to a code law system. In addition, the UK is the 
country with the most observations in our sample. For these reasons, we are particularly 
interested in whether our overall findings hold in the UK. Therefore, we estimate the 
regression models first reported in Table 5 with UK observations only. The untabulated 
results show GRI_Score to be positive and highly significant (p = 0.005), GRI_A to be 
positive and significant (p = 0.009), GRI_B to be positive and significant (p = 0.085), 
and GRI_C to be negative and significantly (p = 0.034) associated with share prices in 
the UK. We also confirm that our Table 5 results hold and are qualitatively similar for 
all non-UK observations. 
As a matter of interest, we do similar tests for firm in countries from Eastern 
Europe and Turkey, and the rest of the sample. Our results generally hold in both sub-
samples.
11
    
Instead of checking whether our findings hold in each of the countries in our 
sample, we now set about trying to establish whether the relationships we have 
identified are stronger in certain types of countries. Specifically, we examine the 
                                                          
11
 Russia, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Turkey only: GRI_Score positive and p = 0.062, GRI_A 
positive and p = 0.001, GRI_B not significant, GRI_C negative and p = 0.072; Sample excluding these 
countries: GRI_Score positive and p = 0.012, GRI_A positive and p = 0.054, GRI_B positive and p = 0.040, 
GRI_C negative and p = 0.043. 
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influence of country variables on economic consequences of CSR disclosure by adding 
the composite country variable we calculated in Table 4 and that was highly significant 
in the Table 4 regression, Governance/Democracy, as well as an interaction term with 
GRI_Score to the basic consequences equation (equation 2). The variable of interest is 
the interaction term, GRI_Score*Governance/Democracy. We expect CSR disclosures 
to be more likely to lead to positive economic outcomes in countries with a higher 
Governance/Democracy score, i.e. countries with more democracy, more effective 
government, better regulation, and more press freedom. Note that the composite country 
measure Governance/Democracy now takes the role previously fulfilled by the country 
dummies in the model. The results are shown in Table 7. The interaction term is 
positive and significant, showing that share prices and CSR disclosures are more 
strongly correlated in countries with better governance as measured by 
Governance/Democracy.  
Table 7 also shows the results of the model that includes separate indicator 
variables for the different GRI levels of CSR disclosure. The coefficient for GRI_C is 
negative and significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, the coefficients estimated for the 
interaction terms are positive and significant for GRI_A*Governance/Democracy (at the 
5% level), and for GRI_B*Governance/Democracy (at the 10% level), but that 
GRI_C*Governance/Democracy is not significantly related to share prices. These 
results show that the association between the higher levels of CSR disclosure (GRI A 
and GRI B level disclosure) and higher share prices is stronger in countries with better 
governance and democracy, but that the association between GRI C and lower share 
prices is not influenced by a country’s governance/democracy levels. 
   <<<Table 7 about here>>> 
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Consequences – CSR disclosures versus general accounting quality 
A potential threat to the interpretation of our results is that our proxy for CSR 
disclosure is, in fact, a proxy for general accounting quality. If this was the case, our 
results would not indicate that the level of CSR disclosures is correlated with share 
prices. Rather, they would suggest that accounting quality is correlated with share 
prices. To rule this alternative explanation out, we add a commonly used proxy for 
accounting quality to our main analyses to ensure that our CSR disclosure measure(s) 
provide incremental share price-related information.  
Following Francis et al. (2005), we use accruals-based measures to proxy for 
earnings quality. We use the McNichols (2002) measure of abnormal accruals, which 
modifies the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, separating accruals based on their 
association with cash flows by regressing the change in working capital accruals on 
cash from operations (current, prior, and future periods); change in revenues; and 
property, plant, and equipment (all measures in the model scaled by total assets). 
Following Dechow et al. (1995), we estimate this equation for each industry/year, 
imposing the condition of at least 8 observations per regression. The inverse of absolute 
value of the error term in these regressions is our measure of accruals quality.  
We add this accounting quality measure to both our main equations first reported 
in Table 5. In both equations, the newly introduced accounting quality measure is not 
significant and our initial results hold. More specifically, in the first equation 
GRI_Score is positive and significant (p = 0.098), while in the second equation, GRI_A 
is positive and not significant, GRI_B is positive and significant (p = 0.021), and GRI_C 
is negative and significant (p = 0.032). Similar to our main findings, the difference 
between GRI_A and GRI_B is not statistically different from zero, whereas the 
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differences between GRI_A and GRI_C and between GRI_B and GRI_C are both 
statistically different from zero. Note that, due to the requirement of 8 observations per 
industry/year, the number of observations for these additional tests reduced 
substantially, potentially explaining the reduction in significance levels of the CSR 
disclosure measures. These tests show that our CSR disclosure measure add explanatory 
value in share price equations, independent of firms’ general accounting quality. 
GRI disclosure measure versus CSR from an outside source 
Even though we know that investors and analysts prefer corporate disclosure as a 
source of CSR information (Radley Yeldar 2012), it could be argued that the market 
knows firms’ CSR from some source unrelated to our CSR disclosure measure 
(GRI_Score). Bloomberg terminals provide an assessment of firms’ ESG (similar to 
CSR). We find this Bloomberg ESG measure to be highly correlated with our CSR 
disclosure measure (GRI_Score) and thus we are unable to use both measures, in 
unaltered form, in the same regression. Therefore, we replace 
GRI_based_disclosure_measure with Unexpected_GRI_Score (the error term in Table 
4, Panel D) in equation 2 and add the Bloomberg ESG measure as a control. We find 
Unexpected_GRI_Score to be positive and significant at the 1% level. We conclude that 
our CSR disclosure measure contain value relevant information over and above any 
CSR information contained in the Bloomberg ESG measure, i.e. an independent source 
of CSR information. 
 
DISCUSSION 
To summarise, in terms of predisposition, we find that firms are likely to disclose 
more CSR information in countries with: better investor protection, higher levels of 
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democracy, more effective government services, higher quality regulations, more press 
freedom, and a lower commitment to environmental policies. In addition, we find firms 
are likely to disclose more CSR information if they: are bigger, are more profitable, 
have a higher book to market ratio, have higher leverage, have older assets, have higher 
capital expenditure, and operate in environmentally sensitive industries.  
In terms of consequences, we find that higher levels of CSR disclosures are 
associated with higher share prices, and that lower levels of CSR disclosure (compared 
to no disclosure) are associated with lower share prices. The association between lower 
CSR disclosure and lower prices are driven by firms operating in sensitive industries. 
These results are also present when we analyse changes in CSR disclosure, and are 
robust to the inclusion of an accounting quality measure in our model, thus showing that 
our CSR disclosure measure is not a proxy for general good disclosure, but contains 
additional value relevant information. In additional tests, we show that our CSR 
disclosure measure contain value relevant information over and above CSR information 
that is known to the market from an independent source. 
When combining country level predispositions with our consequences analysis, 
we find these positive share price consequences to be stronger in countries with stronger 
governance structures, i.e., in countries with more democracy, more government 
effectiveness, better regulatory quality, and more press freedom, share prices are more 
strongly associated with CSR disclosure levels. These results imply that market 
participants find CSR disclosures more informative in countries where investors are in a 
better position to voice their concerns (through democratic mechanisms and through the 
media), and where these opportunities to voice concerns have resulted in better 
regulation and more effective government implementa
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This paper represents several advances on the prior literature. First, we are the 
first to show a differential association between CSR disclosure and economic 
consequences depending on the level of CSR disclosure. Specifically, our findings 1) 
that a high level of CSR disclosure is associated with higher share prices, but 2) that a 
low level of CSR disclosure in sensitive industries is associated with lower share prices 
(than firms with no CSR disclosure), provides the first indication in the research 
literature that social, or investor, expectations regarding CSR disclosures can lead to 
different financial consequences. We conclude that investors interpret lower than 
expected levels of CSR disclosure as an indication that a firm is trying to hide the 
presence of adverse CSR issues that could lead to future liabilities. Our findings also 
suggest that it is not necessarily easy for companies with adverse CSR to mimic 
companies with good CSR by disclosing a high level of CSR information.  
Second, whereas the few prior multi-country CSR studies typically use two 
country level measures, namely a continuous “rule of law” measure and a “code 
law/common law” indicator variable (e.g. Simnett et al. 2009, Dhaliwal et al. 2012)
12
, 
we identify and use several new country level measures that provide better 
understandings of the multiple drivers of CSR disclosure, such as investor protection 
mechanisms, democratic institutions, press freedom, and the prioritization of 
environmental policy goals. We also use these more explicatory country measures to 
document the kinds of jurisdictions (related to regulation and freedoms to voice 
concerns) where the link between CSR disclosure and share prices is stronger. 
In a third advance on the prior literature, unlike prior studies, we focus on 
European countries. European countries are relatively similar in terms of factors like 
                                                          
12
 We are aware of a working paper, Cahan et al. (2012), that uses more country level disclosures in a 
multi country CSR study, but this study uses a different CSR disclosure measure (composed of several 
sub-measures), examines disclosure in a single year, does not focus exclusively on European firms, and 
does not separately assess the effect of different levels of CSR disclosure. 
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economic development. However, there are still differences among European countries 
in terms of the relative levels of investor protection, democracy, government efficiency, 
regulatory quality, press freedom, and emphasis on environmental policies. In this 
paper, we investigate how these factors influence the relationship between CSR 
disclosure and firm value. 
A fourth major advance on the prior literature is based on the characteristics of 
our CSR disclosure measure, which is superior by 1) encompassing disclosures in all 
media, 2) not being a simple indicator variable that ignores the actual content of CSR 
disclosures, but incorporating a level of disclosure, 3) providing greater variation, 4) not 
being based on a self-constructed disclosure index incorporating potential bias, 5) and 
being less open to incorrect coding. With our CSR disclosure measure, we are for the 
first time able to show that the level of CSR disclosure matters. This kind of analysis 
was not possible in, e.g., Dhaliwal et al. (2011) with their indicator variable for CSR 
disclosure. 
Our CSR measure is superior to the one used by Gietl et al. (2012), because their 
measure combines the level of CSR disclosure with whether the GRI level is validated 
by a third party or not. This combination is not helpful, as the relationship between 
these two different aspects of disclosure and any potential economic consequences can 
be are potentially in opposite directions. In addition, their study does not control for 
country-level variations. Therefore, our findings are both more reliable and more 
comprehensive than Gietl et al.’s (2012) counter-intuitive results. 
In terms of the practical implications of our research, given knowledge of our 
findings, both capital market participants and managers may be motivated to pursue 
CSR disclosure at a higher level (market participants to maximise returns and managers 
to enhance job security and incentive pay), regulators may be concerned about the 
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opportunities for managers to act opportunistically and consider implementing CSR 
disclosure regulation, and social and environmental activists may use the positive link 
between CSR disclosure and returns as an argument to convince firms to disclose more.  
 
CONCLUSION 
We examine the CSR disclosures of the top 500 European firms during a recent 
four year period (2007-2010). We hand collect firms’ GRI level as a measure of the 
extent of their CSR disclosure. About one third of the firms in our sample disclose this 
GRI measure. 
We find evidence to support our hypothesis that there is a higher likelihood to 
disclose higher levels of CSR among firms in countries with: greater investor protection 
measures, higher levels of democracy, more government effectiveness, higher quality 
regulations, more press freedom, and a lesser commitment to environmental policies. At 
the firm level, we find that firms are more likely to disclose higher levels of CSR if they 
are larger, more profitable, have higher book to market ratios, are more highly 
leveraged, have older assets, spend more on capital, and operate in environmentally 
sensitive industries. 
In general, we find evidence that higher levels of CSR disclosure are associated 
with higher share prices. However, when we examine the association between different 
levels of CSR disclosure and share prices, we find that a high level of CSR disclosure is 
associated with higher share prices, but that a low level of CSR disclosure in sensitive 
industries is associated with lower share prices, compared to no CSR disclosure. As 
such, CSR disclosures can be said to embody information that is value relevant to 
investors. Note that our measure of the level of CSR disclosure, GRI disclosure level, 
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measures the level of compliance to the GRI G3 guidelines and not the quality of the 
reporting or the sustainability performance.  
We also find evidence that the positive economic association at the higher levels 
of disclosure is more pronounced in countries with higher levels of democracy, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality and press freedom. This implies that 
market participants find CSR disclosures more informative in countries where investors 
are in a better position to voice their concerns (through democratic mechanisms and 
through the media), and where opportunities to voice concerns have resulted in better 
regulation and more effective government implementation of regulations.  
We perform several robustness checks on our findings. First, we repeat our tests 
with the subsample of firms that disclose a GRI disclosure level and find similar results. 
Second, in order to address endogeneity concerns, we use two changes specifications 
and find that upward (downward) changes in GRI disclosure level are associated with 
higher (lower) share prices; as well as that following GRI guidelines for the first time is 
associated with higher share prices. We further address endogeneity concerns by 
showing that our results disappear when we repeat the analyses with the dependent 
variable, share prices, in the prior time period. We show that when we control for 
general accounting quality, our results hold, implying that CSR disclosures add distinct 
information and should not be regarded as a mere proxy for general accounting quality. 
Finally, we show that our CSR disclosure measure contain value relevant information 
over and above CSR information known to the market from an independent source. 
In common with all research, our results should be treated with caution. Our 
measure of CSR disclosure represents the level of GRI G3 disclosure, therefore it does 
not measure reporting quality or sustainability performance. Our ‘consequences’ model, 
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a modified Ohlson (1995) model, only shows an association between the level of CSR 
disclosure and share prices and does not confirm causality.   
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Annex 1 – Variable definitions 
Disclosure Variables 
GRI_Score Coded 3 for firms disclosing GRI at the A level, 2 for GRI B level disclosure, 1 for GRI 
C level disclosure, 0 for not reporting using the GRI disclosure framework. Note: firms 
can disclose a limited number of CSR items for a GRI C-rating (or level of disclosure), 
increase disclosures for a B-rating, or disclose all guideline items for a GRI A-rating 
GRI_A 
GRI_B 
GRI_C 
Indicator variable coded 1 for firms with a GRI disclosure level of A, otherwise 0 
Indicator variable coded 1 for firms with a GRI disclosure level of B, otherwise 0 
Indicator variable coded 1 for firms with a GRI disclosure level of C, otherwise 0 
Country-level variables 
Law Measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate 
insiders: Anti-self-dealing score, based on Djankov et al. (2008). The index considers (1) 
vote by mail; (2) shares not blocked or deposited; (3) cumulative voting; (4) oppressed 
minority; (5) pre-emptive rights; and (6) capital to call meeting 
Voice Voice and accountability, a World Bank measure, reported in Kaufman et al. (2010) 
Gov_Eff Government effectiveness, a World Bank measure, reported in Kaufman et al. (2010) 
Reg_Qual Regulatory quality, a World Bank measure, reported in Kaufman et al. (2010) 
Press Freedom of the press, as measured by Reporters without borders 
Env_Perf Environmental performance index, Yale Centre for environmental  law and policy 
Firm-level variables (data from Datastream) 
Size Size, measured as logarithm of  total assets  
ROA Net income (before extraordinary items and preferred dividends) / beginning total assets 
Fin Financing, measured as (sales less purchases) of common and preferred shares plus 
change in long term debt 
B_M Book to market value of equity ratio 
Lev Leverage ratio, calculated as total debt divided by total assets 
Internat International trade, calculated as the percentage of sales made in countries other than the 
firms’ headquarters 
Volat Share price volatility, measured as the standard deviation of market-adjusted monthly 
stock return during one year  
New Firms’ asset newness, measured as net property plant and equipment (PPE)/ gross PPE 
Capex Capital expenditure, measured as capital expenditures / sales  
Ind_Sens Industry sensitivity, an indicator variables coded one for firms operating in 
environmentally sensitive industries, and zero otherwise. Sensitive industries are 
identified by the SIC codes described in De Villiers et al. (2011), except regulated 
utilities industry (electricity, gas and waste water) – see footnote for SIC codes 
Utility Regulated utility industry (electricity, gas and waste water), an indicator variable coded 
one for firms in this industry, and zero otherwise – see footnote for SIC codes  
Share_Price Closing market value per share, three months after fiscal year end 
EPS Earnings per share, as reported 
BV_pS Book value per share, measured at the end of the fiscal year 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive statistics 
Panel A – Descriptive statistics for CSR disclosure measures by country 
Country Frequency Percent of total Mean of 
GRI_Score 
Austria 13 1.06 1.85 
Belgium 32 2.61 0.56 
Czech Republic 4 0.33 0.00 
Denmark 40 3.26 0.45 
Finland 40 3.26 1.23 
France 202 16.46 0.29 
Germany 149 12.14 0.85 
Greece 13 1.06 0.85 
Hungary 12 0.98 1.00 
Ireland 24 1.96 0.50 
Italy 48 3.91 1.27 
Luxemburg 3 0.24 0.33 
Netherlands 65 5.30 1.02 
Norway 21 1.71 0.90 
Poland 4 0.33 1.00 
Portugal 21 1.71 1.38 
Russia 43 3.50 0.21 
Spain 54 4.40 1.70 
Sweden 79 6.44 0.85 
Switzerland 92 7.50 0.91 
Turkey 22 1.79 0.05 
United Kingdom 246 20.05 0.66 
Total 1,227 100.00 0.75 
GRI_Score measures the level of corporate social responsibility disclosure and takes a value of 3 for 
firms disclosing GRI at the A level, 2 for GRI B level disclosure, 1 for GRI C level disclosure, 0 for not 
reporting using the GRI disclosure framework.  
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Panel B – Descriptive statistics for CSR disclosure frequencies 
GRI disclosure 
level 
Value assigned in 
the variable 
GRI_Score 
Frequency (%) 
A 3 202 (16.46) 
B 2 138 (11.25) 
C 1 42  (3.42) 
GRI not followed 0 845 (68.87) 
 Total 1,227 (100) 
GRI_Score measures the level of corporate social responsibility disclosure and takes a value of 3 for 
firms disclosing GRI at the A level, 2 for GRI B level disclosure, 1 for GRI C level disclosure, 0 for not 
reporting using the GRI disclosure framework.  
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Panel C – Descriptive statistics for country and firm-level variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Country level measures    
Law 3.480 1.023 1.000 5.000 
Voice 1.243 0.488 -0.986 1.618 
Gov_Eff 1.481 0.555 -0.425 2.338 
Reg_Qual 1.430 0.465 -0.453 1.924 
Press 7.796 10.479 0.000 60.880 
Env_Perf 81.682 7.806 58.100 95.500 
Firm level measures     
Size 16.144 1.273 12.585 19.385 
ROA 0.071 0.075 -0.339 0.631 
Fin (millions) 0.414 2.891 0.000 45.800 
B_M 0.554 0.442 -0.454 4.687 
Lev 0.264 0.161 0.0000 1.197 
Internat 0.572 0.311 0.0000 1.536 
Volat 26.760 8.488 11.990 73.880 
New 0.512 0.153 0.135 1.000 
Capex 0.102 0.203 0.000 3.786 
Ind_Sens 0.262 0.440 0.000 1.000 
Utility 0.072 0.258 0.000 1.000 
Share_Price 60.602 366.757 0.020 7,810.670 
EPS 3.968 34.025 -224.977 813.341 
BV_pS 34.596 280.892 -0.566 5,581.547 
N = 1,227, the number of observations with no missing data for all variables in this table.  
Law is an anti-self-dealing score, based on Djankov et al. (2008). The index considers (1) vote by mail; 
(2) shares not blocked or deposited; (3) cumulative voting; (4) oppressed minority; (5) pre-emptive rights; 
and (6) capital to call meeting. Voice, Gov_Eff, and Reg_Qual are the following World Bank measures as 
reported by Kaufman et al. (2010): Voice and Accountability, Government effectiveness, and Regulatory 
quality. Press is freedom of the press, as measured by Reporters without borders. Env_Perf is the 
environmental performance index of the Yale Centre for environmental law and policy. Size is measured 
as logarithm of total assets. ROA is net income (beipd) / beginning total assets. Fin is financing, measured 
as (sales less purchases) of common and preferred shares plus change in long term debt. B_M is book to 
market value of equity ratio. Lev is the leverage ratio, calculated as total debt divided by total assets. 
Internat is a measure of international trade, calculated as the percentage of sales made in countries other 
than the firms’ headquarters. Volat is share price volatility. New is firms’ asset newness, measured as net 
property plant and equipment (PPE)/ gross PPE. Capex is capital expenditure, measured as capital 
expenditures / sales. Ind_Sens is industry sensitivity, an indicator variables coded one for firms operating 
in environmentally sensitive industries, and zero otherwise. Sensitive industries are identified by the SIC 
codes described in De Villiers et al. (2011). Utility is coded one for firms operating in the regulated utility 
industry, otherwise zero. Share_Price is the closing market value per share, three months after fiscal year 
end. EPS is earnings per share. BV_pS is book value per share, measured at the end of the fiscal year. 
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TABLE 2 
Correlation tables 
Panel A – Correlations between GRI_Score and country variables 
 
GRI_Score Law Voice Gov_Eff Reg_Qual Press Env_Perf 
GRI_Score 1       
Law 0.044 1      
Voice 0.104 -0.044 1     
Gov_Eff 0.029 -0.038 0.875 1    
Reg_Qual 0.069 0.136 0.916 0.902 1   
Press -0.119 0.060 -0.965 -0.822 -0.886 1  
Env_Perf -0.059 0.046 0.383 0.443 0.315 -0.352 1 
The correlations in bold are statistically significant at the 5% level.  
GRI_Score measures the level of corporate social responsibility disclosure and takes a value of 3 for firms disclosing GRI at the A level, 2 for GRI B level disclosure, 1 for 
GRI C level disclosure, 0 for not reporting using the GRI disclosure framework. Law is an anti-self-dealing score, based on Djankov et al. (2008). The index considers (1) 
vote by mail; (2) shares not blocked or deposited; (3) cumulative voting; (4) oppressed minority; (5) pre-emptive rights; and (6) capital to call meeting. Voice, Gov_Eff, and 
Reg_Qual are the following World Bank measures as reported by Kaufman et al. (2010): Voice and Accountability, Government effectiveness, and Regulatory quality. Press 
is freedom of the press, as measured by Reporters without borders. Env_Perf is the environmental performance index of the Yale Centre for environmental law and policy. 
 
 
 
50 
 
Panel B – Correlations between GRI_Score and firm-level variables 
 
GRI_Score Size ROA FIN B_M LEV Internat Volat New Capex Ind_Sens Utility Price EPS BV_pS 
Size 0.305 1              
ROA -0.032 -0.303 1             
FIN 0.078 0.187 -0.005 1            
B_M 0.094 0.248 -0.289 0.009 1           
LEV 0.072 0.219 -0.332 0.131 -0.009 1          
Internat 0.056 0.121 -0.039 0.006 -0.071 -0.161 1         
Volat -0.066 -0.187 -0.118 -0.071 0.224 -0.123 0.063 1        
New -0.046 0.023 0.028 0.093 0.104 0.178 -0.134 0.088 1       
Capex 0.056 0.013 -0.061 0.043 0.021 0.224 -0.088 -0.014 0.391 1      
Ind_Sens 0.123 0.027 0.054 0.027 0.108 -0.162 0.186 0.118 0.059 0.005 1     
Utility 0.101 0.188 -0.092 0.139 0.050 0.152 -0.236 -0.122 0.202 0.142 -0.166 1    
Share_Price -0.033 0.034 0.019 -0.012 0.021 -0.002 -0.003 -0.010 0.022 0.003 -0.011 -0.032 1   
EPS -0.023 0.041 0.047 -0.019 0.010 -0.000 0.014 -0.013 0.016 0.015 -0.013 -0.021 0.851 1  
BV_pS -0.017 0.072 -0.023 -0.009 0.062 0.015 -0.012 0.001 0.037 0.011 -0.026 -0.024 0.939 0.771 1 
The correlations in bold are statistically significant at the 5% level.  
GRI_Score measures the level of corporate social responsibility disclosure and takes a value of 3 for firms disclosing GRI at the A level, 2 for GRI B level disclosure, 1 for 
GRI C level disclosure, 0 for not reporting using the GRI disclosure framework. Size is measured as logarithm of total assets. ROA is net income (beipd) / beginning total 
assets. Fin is financing, measured as (sales less purchases) of common and preferred shares plus change in long term debt. B_M is book to market value of equity ratio. Lev is 
the leverage ratio, calculated as total debt divided by total assets. Internat is a measure of international trade, calculated as the percentage of sales made in countries other than 
the firms’ headquarters. Volat is share price volatility. New is firms’ asset newness, measured as net property plant and equipment (PPE)/ gross PPE. Capex is capital 
expenditure, measured as capital expenditures / sales. Ind_Sens is industry sensitivity, an indicator variables coded one for firms operating in environmentally sensitive. 
industries, and zero otherwise. Sensitive industries are identified by the SIC codes described in De Villiers et al. (2011). Utility is coded one for firms operating in the 
regulated utility industry, otherwise zero. Share_Price is the closing market value per share, three months after fiscal year end. EPS is earnings per share. BV_pS is book value 
per share, measured at the end of the fiscal year. 
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TABLE 3 
Predisposition towards CSR disclosures (Ordered Logit models) 
GRI_Score Expected 
sign 
Law Voice Gov_Eff Reg_Qual Press Env_Perf 
Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value 
Law + 0.137 0.020           
Voice +   0.893 0.000         
Gov_Eff +     0.362 0.004       
Reg_Qual +       0.713 0.000     
Press -         -0.048 0.000   
Env_Perf ?           -0.016 0.049 
Size + 0.500 0.000 0.528 0.000 0.520 0.000 0.530 0.000 0.544 0.000 0.499 0.000 
ROA + 3.168 0.001 3.983 0.000 3.516 0.001 3.757 0.000 4.050 0.000 3.156 0.001 
Fin + 0.000 0.448 0.000 0.499 0.000 0.482 0.000 0.467 0.000 0.472 0.000 0.458 
B_M + 0.290 0.026 0.402 0.006 0.316 0.018 0.388 0.006 0.432 0.004 0.216 0.080 
Lev + 1.004 0.017 1.105 0.010 1.118 0.009 1.074 0.012 1.085 0.012 0.991 0.018 
Internat + 0.256 0.134 -0.014 0.476 0.129 0.295 -0.017 0.472 -0.046 0.424 0.315 0.086 
Volat ? 0.001 0.872 0.009 0.322 0.003 0.696 0.005 0.553 0.008 0.368 -0.001 0.869 
New - -2.251 0.000 -1.614 0.001 -1.828 0.000 -1.912 0.000 -1.568 0.001 -2.059 0.000 
Capex + 0.920 0.002 0.848 0.003 0.933 0.002 0.900 0.002 0.841 0.003 0.936 0.002 
Ind_Sens + 0.738 0.000 0.814 0.000 0.755 0.000 0.785 0.000 0.796 0.000 0.719 0.000 
Utility ? 0.722 0.004 0.796 0.002 0.788 0.002 0.794 0.002 0.764 0.002 0.723 0.004 
N  1,227 1,227 1,227 1,227 1,227 1,227 
Prob > chi
2
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
The table reports the results of ordered logit regressions with GRI_Score as the dependent variable. 
P-values are one-tailed for variables with predicted signs. 
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GRI_Score measures the level of corporate social responsibility disclosure and takes a value of 3 for firms disclosing GRI at the A level, 2 for GRI B level disclosure, 1 for 
GRI C level disclosure, 0 for not reporting using the GRI disclosure framework. Law is an anti-self-dealing score, based on Djankov et al. (2008). The index considers (1) 
vote by mail; (2) shares not blocked or deposited; (3) cumulative voting; (4) oppressed minority; (5) pre-emptive rights; and (6) capital to call meeting. Voice, Gov_Eff, and 
Reg_Qual are the following World Bank measures as reported by Kaufman et al. (2010): Voice and Accountability, Government effectiveness, and Regulatory quality. Press 
is freedom of the press, as measured by Reporters without borders. Env_Perf is the environmental performance index of the Yale Centre for environmental law and policy. 
Size is measured as logarithm of total assets. ROA is net income (beipd) / beginning total assets. Fin is financing, measured as (sales less purchases) of common and preferred 
shares plus change in long term debt. B_M is book to market value of equity ratio. Lev is the leverage ratio, calculated as total debt divided by total assets. Internat is a 
measure of international trade, calculated as the percentage of sales made in countries other than the firms’ headquarters. Volat is share price volatility. New is firms’ asset 
newness, measured as net property plant and equipment (PPE)/ gross PPE. Capex is capital expenditure, measured as capital expenditures / sales. Ind_Sens is industry 
sensitivity, an indicator variables coded one for firms operating in environmentally sensitive industries, and zero otherwise. Sensitive industries are identified by the SIC 
codes described in De Villiers et al. (2011). Utility is coded one for firms operating in the regulated utility industry, otherwise zero.
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TABLE 4 
Principal components analysis of predisposition towards CSR disclosures 
Panel A – Eigenvalues of the correlation matrix 
 Principal  
components 
Eigenvalue 
Variance explained 
(%) 
Cumulative 
variance (%) 
PC1 3.877 64.62 64.62 
PC2 1.033 17.22 81.83 
PC3 0.816 13.60 95.43 
PC4 0.196 3.26 98.69 
PC5 0.050 0.83 99.52 
PC6 0.029 0.48 100.00 
N=1,227 
 
Panel B – Weights of the two country factors 
Variable       PC1       PC2 Unexplained 
Law 0.003 0.974 0.019 
Voice 0.494 -0.068 0.050 
Gov_Eff 0.478 -0.039 0.114 
Reg_Qual 0.483 0.112 0.083 
Press -0.481 0.090 0.093 
Env_Perf 0.251 0.154 0.731 
Law is an anti-self-dealing score, based on Djankov et al. (2008). The index considers (1) vote by mail; (2) 
shares not blocked or deposited; (3) cumulative voting; (4) oppressed minority; (5) pre-emptive rights; and (6) 
capital to call meeting. Voice, Gov_Eff, and Reg_Qual are the following World Bank measures as reported by 
Kaufman et al. (2010): Voice and Accountability, Government effectiveness, and Regulatory quality. Press is 
freedom of the press, as measured by Reporters without borders. Env_Perf is the environmental performance 
index of the Yale Centre for environmental law and policy.  
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Panel C – PC1: Governance/Democracy measure by country 
Country Frequency Percent of 
total 
PC1: 
Governance/Democracy 
PC2:  
Country_Law 
Austria 13 1.06 0.920 -0.915 
Belgium 32 2.61 -0.020 -1.724 
Czech Republic 4 0.33 -1.006 0.339 
Denmark 40 3.26 1.642 0.398 
Finland 40 3.26 1.537 -0.001 
France 202 16.46 -0.185 -0.424 
Germany 149 12.14 0.481 -0.967 
Greece 13 1.06 -2.271 -1.611 
Hungary 12 0.98 -1.220 -1.471 
Ireland 24 1.96 0.624 -1.969 
Italy 48 3.91 -1.976 0.462 
Luxemburg 3 0.24 0.743 -2.524 
Netherlands 65 5.30 0.876 -0.631 
Norway 21 1.71 1.183 0.015 
Poland 4 0.33 -1.957 -1.702 
Portugal 21 1.71 -0.875 -1.024 
Russia 43 3.50 -8.101 0.695 
Spain 54 4.40 -1.024 1.397 
Sweden 79 6.44 1.591 0.115 
Switzerland 92 7.50 1.601 -0.319 
Turkey 22 1.79 -5.319 -1.402 
United 
Kingdom 
246 20.05 0.589 1.486 
Total 1,227 100.00  
 
The table reports the composite country level measures PC1 and PC2 from Panel B.  
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Panel D – Ordered logit with 2 country factors and firm-level variables 
GRI_Score Expected sign Coef. P-value 
PC1: Governance/Democracy + 0.166 0.000 
PC2: Country_Law + 0.092 0.086 
Size + 0.529 0.000 
ROA + 3.737 0.000 
Fin + 0.000 0.476 
B_M + 0.405 0.005 
Lev + 1.094 0.011 
Internat + 0.011 0.482 
Volat ? 0.007 0.424 
New - -1.903 0.000 
Capex + 0.885 0.003 
Ind_Sens + 0.791 0.000 
Utility ? 0.783 0.002 
 / cut1  9.786  
/ cut2  9.973  
/ cut 3  10.733  
N  1,227 
Prob > chi
2
  0.000 
The table reports the results of an ordered logit regression with standard errors clustered by country 
P-values are one-tailed for variables with predicted signs.  
GRI_Score measures the level of corporate social responsibility disclosure and takes a value of 3 for firms 
disclosing GRI at the A level, 2 for GRI B level disclosure, 1 for GRI C level disclosure, 0 for not reporting 
using the GRI disclosure framework. Governance/Democracy is PC1 calculated in Table 4, Panel B. 
Country_Law is PC2 calculated in Table 4, Panel B. Size is measured as logarithm of total assets. ROA is net 
income (beipd) / beginning total assets. Fin is financing, measured as (sales less purchases) of common and 
preferred shares plus change in long term debt. B_M is book to market value of equity ratio. Lev is the leverage 
ratio, calculated as total debt divided by total assets. Internat is a measure of international trade, calculated as the 
percentage of sales made in countries other than the firms’ headquarters. Volat is share price volatility. New is 
firms’ asset newness, measured as net property plant and equipment (PPE)/ gross PPE. Capex is capital 
expenditure, measured as capital expenditures / sales. Ind_Sens is industry sensitivity, an indicator variables 
coded one for firms operating in environmentally sensitive industries, and zero otherwise. Sensitive industries 
are identified by the SIC codes described in De Villiers et al. (2011). Utility is coded one for firms operating in 
the regulated utility industry, otherwise zero. 
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TABLE 5 
Consequences of CSR disclosures (Share price valuation models)   
Market price per share Expected 
sign 
GRI_Score Dummies for levels of GRI 
  Coef. P-value Coef. P-value 
EPS + 5.693 0.000 5.709 0.000 
BV_pS + 0.798 0.000 0.799 0.000 
GRI_Score + 0.788 0.007   
GRI_A +   2.035 0.028 
GRI_B ?   3.160 0.018 
GRI_C -   -7.315 0.022 
Size ? -5.190 0.002 -5.307 0.002 
Ind_Sens ? 5.468 0.152 5.750 0.132 
Utility ? 2.614 0.205 2.859 0.166 
Constant  72.277 0.004 76.737 0.004 
Dummies for years  Included Included 
Dummies for countries  Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
  0.708 0.709 
N  1,176 1,176 
The table reports the results of ordinary least squares regressions with standard errors clustered by country and 
observations trimmed at 1% and 99% for the market price per share, earnings per share, and book value per 
share. 
P-values are one-tailed for variables with predicted signs. 
The dependent variable is the market price per share, Share_Price. EPS is earnings per share. BV_pS is book 
value per share, measured at the end of the fiscal year. GRI_Score measures the level of corporate social 
responsibility disclosure and takes a value of 3 for firms disclosing GRI at the A level, 2 for GRI B level 
disclosure, 1 for GRI C level disclosure, 0 for not reporting using the GRI disclosure framework. GRI_A, 
GRI_B, and GRI_C are indicator variables taking a value of 1 if a company discloses that they disclose CSR at 
the A, B, or C GRI level, otherwise 0. Size is measured as logarithm of total assets. Ind_Sens is industry 
sensitivity, an indicator variables coded one for firms operating in environmentally sensitive industries, and zero 
otherwise. Sensitive industries are identified by the SIC codes described in De Villiers et al. (2011). Utility takes 
a value of one if the firm operates in the regulated utility industry, otherwise zero. 
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TABLE 6 
Consequences of CSR disclosures (Share price valuation model excluding firms with no GRI_Score) 
 
Basic model (Sample excluding firms with no GRI_Score) 
  GRI_Score Dummies for levels 
of GRI (GRI_C 
dropped) 
Market price per share Expected 
sign 
Coef. P-value Coef. P-value 
EPS + 7.011 0.000 7.107 0.000 
BV_pS + 0.525 0.000 0. 537 0.000 
GRI_Score + 2.658 0.027   
GRI_A +   9.677 0.007 
GRI_B ?   11.014 0.019 
Size ? -5.766 0.013 -5.921 0.011 
Ind_Sens ? 0.700 0.835 1.317 0.702 
Utility ? -0.702 0.759 -0.329 0.880 
Constant ? 93.997 0.019 98.528 0.013 
Dummies for years  Included Included 
Dummies for countries  Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
  0.784 0.788 
N  370 370 
The table reports the results of ordinary least squares regressions with standard errors clustered by country and 
observations trimmed at 1% and 99% for the market price per share, earnings per share, and book value per 
share. Results shown with GRI_C dropped out of the model. 
P-values are one-tailed for variables with predicted signs.  
The dependent variable is the market price per share, Share_Price. EPS is earnings per share. BV_pS is book 
value per share, measured at the end of the fiscal year. GRI_Score measures the level of corporate social 
responsibility disclosure and takes a value of 3 for firms disclosing GRI at the A level, 2 for GRI B level 
disclosure, 1 for GRI C level disclosure, 0 for not reporting using the GRI disclosure framework. GRI_A, GRI_B, 
and GRI_C are indicator variables taking a value of 1 if a company discloses that they disclose CSR at the A, B, or C GRI 
level, otherwise 0. Size is measured as logarithm of total assets. Ind_Sens is industry sensitivity, an indicator 
variables coded one for firms operating in environmentally sensitive industries, and zero otherwise. Sensitive 
industries are identified by the SIC codes described in De Villiers et al. (2011). Utility takes a value of one if the 
firm operates in the regulated utility industry otherwise zero.  
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TABLE 7 
Consequences (Share price valuation models) including Governance/Democracy 
Market price per share Expected 
sign 
GRI_Score Dummies for levels of GRI 
Coef. P-value Coef. P-value 
EPS + 6.151 0.000 6.168 0.000 
BV_pS + 0.867 0.000 0.867 0.000 
GRI_Score + 0.489 0.214   
GRI_A +   1.199 0.225 
GRI_B ?   2.553 0.261 
GRI_C -   -8.992 0.007 
Governance/Democracy + 0.556 0.279 0.565 0.287 
GRI_Score*Governance/Democracy + 0.708 0.016   
GRI_A*Governance/Democracy +   1.763 0.027 
GRI_B*Governance/Democracy +   1.634 0.089 
GRI_C*Governance/Democracy +   0.849 0.255 
Size ? -5.123 0.005 -5.262 0.004 
Ind_Sens ? 4.293 0.156 4.720 0.121 
Utility ? 2.879 0.102 3.015 0.108 
Constant  77.619 0.005 79.776 0.004 
Dummies for years  Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
  0.685 0.686 
N  1,176 1,176 
The table reports the results of ordinary least squares regressions with standard errors clustered by country and 
observations trimmed at 1% and 99% for the market price per share, earnings per share, and book value per 
share. 
P-values are one-tailed for variables with predicted signs. 
The dependent variable is the market price per share, Share_Price. EPS is earnings per share. BV_pS is book 
value per share, measured at the end of the fiscal year. GRI_Score measures the level of corporate social 
responsibility disclosure and takes a value of 3 for firms disclosing GRI at the A level, 2 for GRI B level 
disclosure, 1 for GRI C level disclosure, 0 for not reporting using the GRI disclosure framework. GRI_A, 
GRI_B, and GRI_C are indicator variables taking a value of 1 if a company discloses that they disclose CSR at 
the A, B, or C GRI level, otherwise 0.  Governance/Democracy is PC1 calculated in Table 4, Panel B and 
represent mainly Voice, Gov_Eff, Reg_Qual and Press. Voice, Gov_Eff, and Reg_Qual are the following World 
Bank measures as reported by Kaufman et al. (2010): Voice and Accountability, Government effectiveness, and 
Regulatory quality. Press is freedom of the press, as measured by Reporters without borders. 
GRI_Score*Governance/Democracy is an interaction term between GRI_Score and Governance/Democracy, 
and similar for interactions with GRI_A, GRI_B and GRI_C. Size is measured as logarithm of total assets. 
Ind_Sens is industry sensitivity, an indicator variables coded one for firms operating in environmentally 
sensitive industries, and zero otherwise. Sensitive industries are identified by the SIC codes described in De 
Villiers et al. (2011). Utility takes a value of one if the firm operates in the regulated utility industry, otherwise 
zero. 
 
